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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Government has no other end but the preservation of property.”1  When 
English philosopher John Locke wrote those words in the late Seventeenth 
Century, he could have scarcely imagined the myriad laws governing intellectual 
property today.  However, his statement is just as valid now as it was when he 
wrote it.  Intellectual property law should function in a manner that allows 
owners to preserve and profit from their creations.  Yet increasingly expensive 
litigation costs complicate trademark owners’ ability to prosecute infringement 
of their marks, and trademark law can be amended to make prosecution of 
infringement more economically feasible. 
The size of the global market for counterfeit goods is staggering.2  In Fiscal 
Year 2013, the U.S. government’s Intellectual Property Rights enforcement 
resulted in 24,361 seizures, with total seizures valued at $1,743,515,581 
according to the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP).3  For 
comparison, LVMH, the international luxury goods conglomerate, posted 
revenues of slightly over $12 billion for 2013 for its fashion and leather goods 
brands.4  The massive size of the counterfeit market renders it imperative that 
the law facilitates and encourages trademark owners to vigilantly protect their 
intellectual property.    
Litigation is quite expensive, and prosecuting every infringement of his 
property may not be economically feasible for a trademark owner.  The 
prosecution of a small-scale infringer can still result in massive legal bills. 
Our traditional “American Rule” of litigation provides that costs, other than 
attorney fees, are provided to the prevailing party unless otherwise specified by 
statute, court order, or elsewhere in the federal rules.5  Trademark is one 
specific area of law that deviates from the traditional standard.  The 1975 
amendments to the Trademark Act of 1946 authorized the award of attorney 
fees in exceptional cases.6  The language of the statute is limited, simply stating 
“[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 John Locke, The Second Treatise, in TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT § 94 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690). 
 2 PEGGY CHAUDHRY & ALAN ZIMMERMAN, PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 10 (2013) (estimating the size of the global counterfeit market anywhere from 200 billion 
to 1 trillion). 
 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SEIZURE STATISTICS FISCAL YEAR 2013, http://www.cbp. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/2013%20IPR%20Stats.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). 
 4 LVMH 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, http://r.lymh-static.com/uploads/2015/04/lvmh_ra2014_ 
gb.pdf. 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1); see Alyestka Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 
247–83 (1974) for an extensive discussion the history of the American Rule. 
 6 Trademark Act, Pub. L. No. 93-600, § 3, 88 Stat. 1955 (1975). 
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prevailing party.”7  The ability to recover attorney fees encourages prosecution 
of infringement by allowing litigation to remain economically viable in cases 
deemed to be exceptional.8 
The ability to recover attorney fees in exceptional cases encourages 
prosecution of infringement, and allows litigation to remain economically 
viable.9  Yet, as Judge Posner stated, “a rainbow of standards has been 
promulgated to define the word ‘exceptional’ in the Lanham Act, some 
seemingly requiring bad faith or other culpability, others following a less 
stringent approach.”10  The Circuits’ varied approaches in determining 
exceptionality apply both to the factor tests used and the burdens placed on 
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants.11  
Congress has created even more confusion through the passing of The Anti-
Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, which introduced statutory 
damages to the Lanham Act for cases involving the use of counterfeit marks.12  
The impact of the introduction of statutory damages to the attorney fee shifting 
provision in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) is subject to limited case law.  The Second 
Circuit has held that electing to receive statutory damages does not prohibit an 
award of attorney fees.13  Conversely, the Ninth Circuit found that § 1117(c) 
makes no provision for attorney fees and reversed a previous award of them.14  
The confusion is compounded because 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) deals with 
intentionally using counterfeit marks in commerce and expressly provides for an 
award of treble profits or damages, whichever is greater, together with 
reasonable attorney fees.15   
Part II.A will provide an overview of trademark law, with an extensive 
discussion of the various causes of action for trademark infringement and 
counterfeiting.  Part II.B will examine how attorney fees are awarded to 
successful litigants within the copyright and patent realms of intellectual 
property.  Part III will discuss how courts award attorney fees within the 
                                                                                                                   
 7 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
 8 See Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(prevailing plaintiff was awarded over $500,000 in attorney fees, despite actual damages being 
slightly over $200,000; litigation would have been prohibitively expensive in this case when 
compared to the value of damage suffered). 
 9 See Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958, 960–65 (7th Cir. 
2010) for a judicial examination of the “semantic jungle” regarding exceptionality under the 
Lanham Act. 
 10 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 111, 120 (D. Mass. 2001). 
 11 See infra Part IV. 
 12 ANTICOUNTERFEITING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1996, 1996 Enacted S. 1136, 104 
Enacted S. 1136, 110 Stat. 1386 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (1996)). 
 13 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 109 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 14 K & N Eng’g v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 15 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2012). 
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trademark sphere.  Part III.A will center on the confusion over how to apply the 
exceptionality standard in trademark infringement cases.  Part III.B will look at 
how courts have interpreted the law with respect to receiving attorney fees in 
conjunction with statutory damages in trademark infringement cases. 
This Note argues in Part IV two distinct points.  The first being that the 
proper standard for determining exceptionality is the presence of malicious, 
fraudulent, deliberate, or willful conduct while holding plaintiffs and defendants 
to equal burdens.  A finding of exceptionality should be based on conduct 
before the commencement of the suit, conduct during litigation, or both.  
Conduct prior to the commencement of the suit meeting the exceptional 
circumstance requirement should be malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful.  
Conduct during litigation that gives rise to exceptionality must meet any of the 
aforementioned factors, viewed through the prism of “abuse of process” as 
outlined by Judge Posner in a 2010 Seventh Circuit opinion.16  Secondly, this 
paper argues that the election of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) 
does not prohibit an award of attorney fees in exceptional cases as that would 
run counter to the legislation’s intent in enacting the statutory damages 
provision.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  TRADEMARK LAW 
Before examining how attorney fees should be awarded in trademark 
infringement cases, it is necessary to outline the various causes of action for 
infringement.  There are separate causes of action depending upon whether the 
mark is registered, whether it is famous, and whether the infringement was so 
great as to result in counterfeiting.  Following the discussion of trademark 
litigation, this Part will look at how the law treats attorney fees in both 
copyright and patent law.  The extensive body of case law in these two areas of 
intellectual property provide guidance as to what a more efficient scheme for 
awarding attorney fees in trademark should look like. 
1.  Trademark Infringement Causes of Action.  The Lanham Act provides for 
three distinct federal causes of action for trademark owners who believe that 
their mark has been infringed.17  First, under § 32(1), a trademark owner has 
protection for his registered mark against any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, 
or colorable imitation of the mark in connection with its use in commerce 
relating to any goods or services likely to cause confusion, mistake, or 
                                                                                                                   
 16 Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012); id. § 1125(a); id. § 1125(c). 
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deception.18  A second cause of action is available to trademark owners whose 
marks are not registered within the United States, and they find similar 
protections available to them under § 43 of the Lanham Act.19 
A third cause of action is provided to a specific subset of trademarks whose 
characteristics provide for special protection.  Under § 43 of the Lanham Act, 
famous marks may bring actions for dilution or tarnishment regardless of 
whether confusion or economic injury is present.20  A famous mark is one that 
is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as an 
indicator of the goods or services source or owner.21  A dilution claim arises 
when a similarity between the contested mark and the famous mark exists, and 
that similarity impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.22  Tarnishment 
means association that harms the reputation of a famous mark.23 
2.  Counterfeiting.  Counterfeiting is a subset of trademark infringement: “All 
counterfeits infringe, but not all infringements are counterfeit.”24  A counterfeit 
mark is a spurious mark that is substantially indistinguishable from a valid 
registered mark.25  The counterfeit industry is not just a threat to producers of 
luxury goods.26  It also affects many other industries, and ties have been 
established linking the sale of counterfeit goods to terrorist organizations.27   
In 1996, Congress amended § 35 of the Lanham Act to introduce statutory 
damages as an alternative to actual damages in counterfeit mark cases.28  The 
legislative history indicates that Congress was particularly concerned with the 
growth of the counterfeit goods market, especially of emerging industries.29  
The current version of § 1117(c) provides statutory damages of not less than 
$1,000 or more than $200,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods sold, and 
allowing for damages to be increased to $2 million in cases of willful 
infringement.30 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Id. § 1114(1). 
 19 Id. § 1125(a). 
 20 Id. § 1125(c). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5.19 (Matthew Bender). 
 25 A counterfeit mark is “a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially 
indistinguishable from, a registered mark.” 
 26 Http://www.semiconductors.org/issues/anticounterfeiting/anti_counterfeiting/. 
 27 Http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2003/PR019. 
 28 See supra note 12. 
 29 H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 2 (1996) (referencing the growth in the counterfeit market from 
$5.5 billion in 1982 to $200 billion in 1996 and industry estimates that counterfeit sales exceeded 
40% of the software industry’s total revenues). 
 30 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2006). 
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B.  AWARDS OF ATTORNEY FEES TO SUCCESSFUL LITIGANTS IN OTHER AREAS 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
It is helpful to examine how the Supreme Court has treated attorney fees 
under the copyright and patent statutes when determining the proper test for 
attorney fees under trademark.  Copyright case law in particular provides insight 
into how the Supreme Court might rule on a hypothetical trademark attorney 
fee case where plaintiffs and defendants were held to differing burdens.31  
Supreme Court jurisprudence in patent law regarding attorney fees is especially 
useful, as the patent32 and trademark33 statutes authorizing attorney fees are 
virtually identical. 
1.  Attorney Fees in Copyright.  Attorney fees are explicitly allowed at the 
court’s discretion under § 505 of the Copyright Act.34  As in trademark law, 
failure to register a copyright will preclude a party from receiving an award of 
statutory damages or attorney fees.35 
The decision to award attorney fees in a copyright infringement action 
hinges upon whether such an award would further the purposes of the 
Copyright Act.36  The most important aim of the Act is the promotion of 
artistic creativity for the public good,37 and that aim is also furthered by 
defendants engaging in meritorious copyright defenses.38  The court in Mattel v. 
MGA Entertainment, Inc. noted that despite MGA’s status as a defendant, it had 
made important contributions to copyright law because the failure to vigorously 
defend the claims could have resulted in a new era of copyright litigation 
centered on stifling competition rather than promoting expression.39  
Defendants who engage in meritorious defenses add to the body of copyright 
case law.  Without these defendants’ contributions, future defendants could be 
deterred from litigation and ultimately settle a case that they may have been able 
to litigate successfully. 
The Supreme Court provided insight into whether a dual standard system in 
attorney fee shifting was constitutional in a 1994 case.40  The dual standard can 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 519–35 (1994). 
 32 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (quoting “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party”). 
 33 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(3) (2006) (quoting “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”). 
 34 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2011) (“[T]he court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the 
prevailing party as part of the costs.”). 
 35 Id. § 412. 
 36 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 705 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 37 Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
 38 Id. (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)). 
 39 Id. (referencing the district court’s reasoning for awarding attorney fees).  
 40 Fogerty, 510 U.S. 517. 
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be defined as awarding prevailing plaintiffs’ attorney fees as a matter of course, 
while prevailing defendants were required to show that the suit was frivolous or 
brought in bad faith.41  In Fogerty v. Fantasy, a successful defendant in a 
copyright infringement action appealed the denial of his claim for reasonable 
attorney fees.42  At issue was the conflict between the dual standard approach of 
the Ninth Circuit and the evenhanded approach of the Third Circuit.43  Those 
favoring the dual standard advanced four arguments.  First, the language of 
§ 505, when read in light of previous decisions, supports implementation of the 
dual standard system.  Second, treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants 
differently comports with the overarching purpose of the Copyright Act.  Third, 
legislative history indicates that Congress ratified the dual standard.  Lastly, the 
dual standard has been followed uniformly by the lower courts.44 
The court rejected any notion that the statutory language of § 505 supports 
treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently and disregarded the 
claim that previous decisions supported a differentiation in the treatment of 
parties.45 
In discussing the second argument for the dual standard, the court noted 
that the purposes of the Copyright Act were far more complex than simply 
maximizing the number of meritorious infringement actions and that 
encouraging defendants to litigate meritorious infringement claims furthers the 
goal of copyright by working to establish clear boundaries.46  This is consistent 
with previous rulings, specifically in Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., where 
the Court said, “[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor 
of authors . . . . [C]opyright assures authors the right to their original 
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work.”47  The court also rejected the third argument 
for the dual standard, disagreeing with the defendant’s notion that the principle 
of ratification led to the adoption of a dual standard.48 
Ultimately, the Fogerty Court rejected the dual standard and the petitioner’s 
argument for adopting the British rule, awarding attorney fees to both parties as 
                                                                                                                   
 41 Id. at 520–21. 
 42 Id. at 519–20. 
 43 Id. at 521. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 522–25 (holding that arguments based on fee shifting decisions under the Civil Rights 
Act must fail).  
 46 Id. at 526–27. 
 47 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991). 
 48 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 533 (holding that there was no settled construction in favor of the dual 
standard under the 1909 Copyright Act which would support the dual standard system under the 
principle of ratification). 
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a matter of course.49  The court held that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants 
were to be treated alike, but that the award of attorney fees came at the court’s 
discretion.50  Most importantly, the court noted the closely related statutes in 
the patent and trademark fields supported a party-neutral approach.51  
2.  Attorney Fees in Patent.  The attorney fee shifting statute in patent simply 
states, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party.”52  While the Supreme Court has not addressed the 
exceptionality requirement in the trademark sphere, it has done so in the patent 
field, most notably in Octane Fitness LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.53  Octane 
Fitness dealt with the Federal Circuit’s statutory interpretation of § 505 in Brooks 
Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.54  There, the Federal Circuit held that a 
case is deemed exceptional in two limited circumstances: first, when there has 
been some material inappropriate conduct relating to the matter in litigation,55 
and second, if “the litigation was brought in subjective bad faith and was 
objectively baseless.”56  The court also noted that the “objectively baseless” 
standard was determined not by the plaintiff’s state of mind when the action 
began, but on an objective assessment of the merits.57  “There is a presumption 
that the assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good 
faith.”  Because of this presumption, exceptionality is determined by a clear and 
convincing evidence standard.58 
In Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court held that the Brooks Furniture framework 
for exceptionality was inconsistent with the statutory text of § 285.59  The Court 
noted that for decades, the proper method for determining exceptionality under 
§ 285 was applied in a discretionary manner assessing various factors.60 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Id. at 534. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 525 n.12. 
 52 35 U.S.C. 285 (2012). 
 53 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 54 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (providing examples of inappropriate conduct and defining 
material inappropriate conduct as conduct that violates FED. R. CIV. P. 11 or similar statutes). 
 55 Id. at 1381 (providing examples of inappropriate conduct and defining material inappropriate 
conduct as the type of conduct to violate FED. R. CIV. P. 11 or like infractions).  
 56 Id. (outlining the two specific conditions in which a patent holder would be required to pay 
attorney fees to an alleged infringer). 
 57 Id. at 1382. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1752–53. 
 60 Id. at 1753–54 (referencing that this approach was applied both before and after the Federal 
Circuit was granted sole jurisdiction of patent claims in 1982 under 28 U.S.C. § 1295); see, e.g., 
True Temper Corp. v. CF & I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 508–09 (10th Cir. 1979) (examining 
good faith and the patentee’s conduct in originally obtaining the patent); Kearney & Trecker 
Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 597 (7th Cir. 1979) (analyzing the “nature of the 
plaintiff’s wrongdoing and its potential impact upon the public”); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 
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The Court then defined an exceptional case as one that “stands out from 
others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position 
(considering both the governing law and facts of the case).”61  It found that the 
Brooks Furniture framework “superimpose[ed] an inflexible framework onto 
statutory text that is inherently flexible.”62  The Court then discussed why both 
of the Federal Circuit’s categories for awarding attorney fees were unduly 
restrictive.63  Lastly, the Court rejected Brooks Furniture for being so demanding 
that it would render § 285 superfluous.64  In regards to the standard of proof, 
the Court noted lower standards in comparable fee shifting statutes,65 and that 
patent infringement litigation had generally been governed by the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.66 
III.  ATTORNEY FEES IN TRADEMARK 
The Lanham Act is the federal statute for trademark protection and was 
signed into law on July 5, 1946.67  The idea of federal trademark protection can 
be traced back to 1791 when Thomas Jefferson was serving as Secretary of 
State.68 A sail cloth maker in Boston petitioned Congress to allow him to 
register his trademark.69  Jefferson favored trademark protection and stated, 
“permi[t] the owner of every manufactory to enter in the record of the court of 
the district . . . the name with which he chooses to mark or designate his wares, 
and rendering it penal to others to put the same mark on any other wares.”70  It 
would not be until 1881 that Jefferson’s vision would come to fruition.71  The 
first federal trademark statute and a statute on counterfeiting were found 
                                                                                                                   
474, 480–81 (8th Cir. 1965) (discussing the procedural posture of the case and the patentee’s lack 
of good faith). 
 61 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 1756–57 (stating that conduct may be unreasonable enough to be defined as rare while 
not rising to the level of sanctionable, and stating that subjective bad faith or exceptionally 
meritless claims on their own could sufficiently differentiate a case from typical actions). 
 64 Id. at 1758 (noting that the standard would be so difficult to meet, it would rarely be used in 
practice). 
 65 Id.  See, e.g., Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 519. 
 66 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758.  See, e.g., Bene v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 688 (1889). 
 67 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2015). 
 68 62 TRADEMARK REP. 239. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
9
Willett: Exceptionally Vague: Attorney Fee Shifting Under the Lanham Act
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
220 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 23:211 
 
unconstitutional.72  Ultimately, a federal statute was passed in 1881,73 replaced 
with the 1905 act,74 supplanted by the 1920 act,75 and in 2015 the Lanham Act 
remains in place with various amendments.76 
Common law preceding the Lanham Act, from the Seventh Circuit, favored 
the recovery of attorney fees in special cases.77  The court in Aladdin 
Manufacturing Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. held that counsel’s fees were properly 
recoverable as compensatory damages due to the finding of willful and 
fraudulent conduct by the defendant.78  However, in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. 
v. Maier Brewing Co., the Supreme Court held that the award of attorney fees 
under the Lanham Act was improper because there was no statutory basis for 
such an award.79  In his dissent, Justice Stewart argued that the fact that 
Congress elected not to interfere with the judicial power to award attorney fees 
was equally as persuasive as the majority’s argument.80  He wrote, “[t]he failure 
to amend the statute to do away with this judicial power speaks as loudly for its 
recognition as the failure to pass the bills referred to by the Court speaks for the 
contrary conclusion.”81 
After eight years under the Fleischmann Distilling rule, Congress passed the 
1975 amendments to the Lanham Act.  The relevant addition was to 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117, reading “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.”82 
The legislative history of the 1975 amendment makes note of the attorney 
fee remedy’s availability in both copyright and patent law.83  The purpose of the 
bill states that it would “[a]uthorize award of attorney fees to the prevailing 
party in trademark litigation where justified by equitable considerations.”84   The 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that the remedy should be available in 
exceptional cases, “[w]here the acts of infringement can be characterized as 
‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful.’ ”85  In addition, it was noted 
                                                                                                                   
 72 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (U.S. 1879) (holding that the Commerce Clause prevented 
Congress from enacting legislation regarding the registration of trademarks not used in interstate 
commerce, rendering the counterfeiting provision of the law unconstitutional). 
 73 21 Stat. 502. 
 74 33 Stat. 724. 
 75 41 Stat. 533. 
 76 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006). 
 77 See Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 1941). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 720 (1967). 
 80 Id. at 723. 
 81 Id. 
 82 1975 Trademark Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat. 1955 (1975). 
 83 S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974). 
 84 Id. at 1. 
 85 Id. at 2. 
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that the attorney fee remedy would work in conjunction with existing 
provisions for treble damages and that attorney fees would be available to 
defendants as well.86  The report noted that the fee-shifting provision would 
provide a complete remedy for plaintiffs, while also providing a remedy to a 
defendant faced with an unfounded suit.87 
The report noted that mass demand and advertising can work to make 
trademark infringement and acts of unfair competition especially appealing to 
unethical competitors.88  The Department of Commerce also stated that the 
availability of treble damages89 could not be regarded as a substitute for the 
recovery of attorney fees.90  It noted that in some instances, actual damages can 
be nominal if the suit is brought promptly against an infringer.91  Lastly, the 
report explicitly states that, as amended, § 35 of the Lanham Act “makes clear 
that a court has discretion as to whether to award treble damages, attorney fees, 
or both, or neither.”92 
A.  CIRCUIT CONFUSION OVER TRADEMARK’S “EXCEPTIONAL” STANDARD FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
An examination into all of the various ways that circuit courts differ from 
one another in applying the attorney fee shifting statute is beyond the scope of 
this Note.  The purpose of providing information on the confusion regarding 
the award of attorney fees is meant to highlight specific instances of confusion, 
primarily those that appear to be in conflict with Supreme Court decisions in 
other areas of intellectual property.  Circuit approaches that are needlessly 
confusing or vague will also be discussed.  Before examining the courts’ divided 
approaches on how to define an “exceptional case,” one must investigate the 
burden placed on either party for proving exceptionality.  The definition of an 
“exception case” breaks down into several sub-issues.  First, courts have varied 
approaches to the proper evidentiary standard for defining an “exceptional 
case.”  Second, there is division over whether equal standards are to be applied 
to both parties, a party neutral approach, or if differing burdens are required.  
Lastly, it is unclear what characteristics of a case will lead to a finding of 
exceptionality.  For example, should courts require willful infringement or bad 
faith for a finding of exceptionality, or something less? 
                                                                                                                   
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 5. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 
 90 S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7136. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit has held that a party seeking fees must demonstrate 
exceptionality by clear and convincing evidence.93  In a 2012 trademark 
infringement case, the First Circuit held that preponderance of the evidence was 
the proper standard for willfulness.94  When the Supreme Court interpreted an 
identical attorney fees statute in patent law, the Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s requirement of establishing entitlement to attorney fees by clear and 
convincing evidence.95  The Court held that preponderance of the evidence was 
the proper standard for determining exceptionality in patent matters.96 
Circuit courts have differing approaches for when plaintiffs and defendants 
may receive attorney fees.  Examples of a party-neutral approach can be found 
in the Second,97 Third,98 and Ninth99 Circuits.  The party neutral approach is 
consistent with Supreme Court decisions in the copyright realm.100 
There is also support for a dual standard from a number of circuits.  A 
Massachusetts’ District Court opinion articulates the case for a differing 
standard on the premise that “infringement of a trademark is only sometimes 
deliberate, [whereas the] prosecution of a lawsuit” is always deliberate.101  The 
Fourth Circuit requires prevailing plaintiffs to show bad faith by the defendant, 
whereas prevailing defendants must show something less than bad faith, such as 
“[e]conomic coercion, groundless arguments, and failure to cite controlling law” 
by the plaintiff.102  The D.C. Circuit has taken a similar stance, holding that “a 
court must find willful or bad faith infringement”103 to award attorney fees to a 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, 155 F.3d 526, 555–56 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 94 Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 193 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that the 
discussion on willfulness was strictly related to infringement and not a discussion concerning an 
award of attorney fees). 
 95 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 195 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that there 
was no precedent within the circuit for applying a different standard to prevailing plaintiffs and 
defendants). 
 98 Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, 224 F.3d 273, n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (referencing 
the evenhanded approach adopted in Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44 (3d 
Cir. 1991)). 
 99 Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. Cal. 1997) (holding that 
the exceptional circumstance requirement was equally applicable to prevailing plaintiffs and 
defendants). 
 100 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517. 
 101 Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 111, n.7 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(stating that applying deliberateness as a factor would result in awarding prevailing defendants 
attorney fees as a matter of course, which runs counter to the meaning of exceptional). 
 102 Retail Servs. v. Freebies Publ’g, 364 F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ale House Mgmt. 
v. Raleigh Ale House, 205 F.3d 137, 144); see also Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co., 
958 F.2d 594, 599 (4th Cir. 1992) (adopting the dual standard endorsed by the D.C. Circuit). 
 103 Reader’s Digest Assoc. v. Conservative Digest, 821 F.2d 800, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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plaintiff and something less than bad faith is sufficient for the prevailing 
defendant.104  A prior D.C. Circuit decision stated that it was unlikely Congress 
wanted to limit prevailing defendants’ recovery of attorney fees to situations 
where the plaintiff acted vexatiously or in an oppressive manner.  Rather, 
Congress intended the plain meaning of exceptional, i.e., “uncommon or not-
run-of-the-mill.”105 
In two separate opinions, the Fourth Circuit opined that its dual standard 
under the Lanham Acts fee shifting provision “may have been called into 
doubt”106 and “was called into considerable doubt”107 in the wake of the Fogerty 
v. Fantasy, Inc. decision.  However, the court has not provided a definitive 
answer on how this decision will affect the Fourth Circuit’s application of this 
dual standard.  The Seventh Circuit has made reference to this possible conflict 
between the Fourth Circuit and Fogerty, noting that the Supreme Court has 
moved away from an analysis giving consideration to the status of a prevailing 
party as a plaintiff or defendant.108  Despite Fogerty controlling within the 
copyright context, the Tenth Circuit has held that there should not be perfect 
harmony between requisite standards for an award of attorney fees to a 
prevailing plaintiff or defendant.109  The Tenth Circuit defended this reasoning 
by explaining that attorney fees are awarded against defendants for their acts of 
infringement, and are awarded against a plaintiff for conduct concerning the 
manner in which the lawsuit was brought and prosecuted.110 
The Second,111 Fifth,112 and Eleventh113 Circuits require a showing of bad 
faith as prerequisite for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff or 
                                                                                                                   
 104 Id. at 809 (citing Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Q Rest., 77 F.2d 521, 526). 
 105 Noxell, 771 F.2d at 526. 
 106 Bubba’s Bar-B-Q Oven, Inc. v. Holland Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 6124, *6 n.4 (4th Cir. 
Apr. 5, 1999). 
 107 Brenco, Inc. v. Roller Bearing Indus., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18171, *14 n.9 (4th Cir. July 
23, 1996). 
 108 FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, 108 F.3d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 109 National Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143, 
1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (doubting the feasibility of an identical standard for plaintiffs and 
defendants). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding 
exceptional cases to be “instances of ‘fraud or bad faith’ (citing Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’ns 
Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1383 (2d Cir. 1993) or ‘willful infringement’ (citing Bambu Sales, Inc. v. 
Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 854 (2d Cir. 1995)”))). 
 112 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2002) (using bad faith 
as a shorthand for a “high degree of culpability” (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 
F.3d 526, 556 (5th Cir. 1998))). 
 113 Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. Fla. 2001) (holding the correct 
standard for exceptionality in the 11th Circuit to be fraud or bad faith). 
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defendant.  Bad faith is defined as “dishonesty of belief or purpose.”114  Patsy’s 
Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., a Second Circuit case, is a typical representation 
of litigating in bad faith.115  Patsy’s dealt with a dispute between two Italian 
restaurants and the sale of their tomato sauces.116  The plaintiff began a retail 
sauce business in 1993, and had annual sales in excess of $1 million at the time 
the case was decided.117  The defendant could not provide the specific date it 
began selling sauce in its restaurant.118  Originally, it claimed that sales began in 
1993, which would have preceded the plaintiff’s sale of sauce.119  However, the 
evidence proffered for defendant’s claimed 1993 sales was a printer’s invoice 
for a label that contained a bar code that was not created until 1998 and an area 
code for a phone number that did not exist until sometime after 1993.120  
Ultimately, the court upheld the award of attorney fees for the plaintiff.  
However, the court also noted that in the absence of the misconduct 
concerning the creation of illegitimate evidence, fees would not have been 
warranted because the defendant had a good faith basis for defending the 
suit.121   
On the contrary, the First,122 Third,123 and Ninth124 Circuits do not require a 
showing of bad faith as a prerequisite for attorney fees.  The First Circuit stated, 
“[w]illfulness short of bad faith or fraud will suffice when equitable 
considerations justify an award and the district court supportably finds the case 
exceptional.”125  The First Circuit also made note of the legislative history and 
declined to “strip ‘deliberate’ and ‘willful’ of meaning.”126  Tamko Roofing Prods. 
Inc. v Ideal Roofing Co. provides a typical example of pre-litigation conduct giving 
rising to exceptionality.127  In closing, the court noted that the totality of 
                                                                                                                   
 114 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 159 (9th ed. 2009). 
 115 Patsy’s, 317 F.3d 209. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 213. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 214. 
 121 Id. at 222. 
 122 Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 123 Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating 
that culpable conduct by the losing party is necessary but can be present in various forms). 
 124 Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Services, Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that circumstances other than bad faith may suffice for an award of attorney fees). 
 125 Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 32. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 33 (noting that Ideal adopted Tamko’s mark without doing a trademark search, Ideal’s 
other choices for names were substantially similar to competitor’s marks, and chose a cursive 
script very similar to one the Plaintiff had used in 1996). 
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circumstances, rather than one specific action, determines exceptionality and an 
award of attorney fees.128 
The Third Circuit case involved a dispute over the trademark 
“SecuraComm” between two competing security-consulting firms.129  The 
Court noted that while a defendant’s willful infringement is often the grounds 
for fee shifting in infringement suits, it is not the only time that an award of fees 
may be appropriate.130  The defendant’s litigation conduct supported the award 
of attorney fees, as the defendant had deliberately tried to overwhelm the 
plaintiff financially.131  
The Ninth Circuit case involved a dispute between two brothers over the 
use of the family name in conjunction with grocery stores.132  The Ninth Circuit 
noted that absence of bad faith on the plaintiff’s part would not exclude an 
award of attorney fees.133  Ultimately, fees were not awarded because the suit 
“raised colorable legal and factual issues” and “raised debatable issues of law 
and fact.”134 
A 2010 Seventh Circuit case provides a practical approach to determining 
exceptionality, specifically examining conduct in litigation.135  The Seventh 
Circuit held that an exceptional case sufficient for an award of attorney fees to 
the prevailing party is present when an unsuccessful plaintiff is guilty of abuse 
of process in suing, or a losing defendant persisted in the infringement for 
which he was being sued in order to impose costs on his opponent.136  Judge 
Posner outlined abuse of process as “the use of the litigation process for an 
improper purpose, whether or not the claim is colorable.”137  While noting that 
abuse of process is not used to describe defendants’ behavior, Judge Posner 
analogized a plaintiff’s abuse of process to a defendant whose infringement is 
blatant and yet who insists on mounting a costly defense.138  Both plaintiffs and 
defendants can act as aggressors leading to a finding of exceptionality as 
“[p]redatory initiation of suit is mirrored in predatory resistance to valid 
claims.”139 
                                                                                                                   
 128 Id. 
 129 Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 274 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 130 Id. at 280. 
 131 Id. at 282. 
 132 Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Services, Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 133 Id. at 827. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 136 Id. at 963–64. 
 137 Id. at 963. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit approach favors treating plaintiffs and defendants the 
same because Lanham Act claims are almost always between corporations.140  
In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s approach avoids a subjective inquiry into a 
party’s state of mind.141  The court specifically noted that it would be sufficient 
to show that an opponent’s claim or defense was objectively unreasonable for a 
case to be deemed exceptional.142 
B.  CONSIDERING ATTORNEY FEES AND STATUTORY DAMAGES FOR 
INFRINGEMENT 
In 1996 Congress passed the Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act 
and amended the Lanham Act to provide statutory damages as a possible 
remedy to prevailing plaintiffs.143  The amendment specifically states that cases 
involving counterfeit marks, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), are eligible for an 
award of statutory damages instead of actual damages and profits, as outlined 
under subsection (a) of § 1117.144  The accompanying Senate Report referenced 
the difficulty in ascertaining actual damages and profits with respect to large-
scale counterfeiting operations.145  The Report noted that the records of 
counterfeiters are often nonexistent or purposely inaccurate, which makes 
proving actual damages extremely difficult, if not impossible.146   Allowing 
trademark owners an election of statutory damages is necessary to combat 
counterfeiters, and statutory “damages are reflective of the damage done to 
business goodwill by infringing trademarks.”147  
1.  Circuit Split on Providing Attorney Fees with Statutory Damages.  Two circuits 
have examined whether the election of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(c) precludes an award of attorney fees.  The Ninth Circuit answered a 
very narrow question, holding that statutory damages precluded an award of 
attorney fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).148  By contrast, the Second Circuit held 
that the election of statutory damages does not preclude an award of attorney 
fees in exceptional cases.149   
                                                                                                                   
 140 Id. at 964 (noting that despite differences in size between litigants, there is no correlation 
between the size of a party and the side from which he litigates). 
 141 Id. at 965. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See supra note 12. 
 144 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012). 
 145 S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 10 (1995).  
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 K&N Eng’g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 149 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 111 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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 a.  The Ninth Circuit Approach.  The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of 
combining statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and an award of 
attorney fees in 2007.150  The appellee in the case was K&N Engineering, Inc. 
(K&N), a firm “engaged in the design, manufacture, and distribution of 
aftermarket automotive air filters, intake kits, and other related products.”151  In 
October of 2004, K&N became aware that the appellants were selling 
unauthorized decals bearing the K&N logo on eBay.152  K&N had previously 
distributed similar decals to its customers via an internet promotion.153  Bulot 
had created vinyl decals in the shape of the K&N logo and sold eighty-nine sets 
of decals with two decals in each set.154  Bulot generated $267 in revenue from 
sale of the decals.155 
K&N filed a complaint in federal court alleging trademark infringement 
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a), trademark counterfeiting under 15 
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), and trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).156  
K&N’s motion for summary judgment was granted and they were awarded 
statutory damages of $20,000 and attorney fees of $100,000 pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1) and (b) respectively.157 
On appeal, Bulot argued that K&N’s decision to receive statutory damages 
excluded the attorney fees remedy under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).  The Court held 
that because § 1117(c) made no provision for attorney fees and § 1117(b) did 
not authorize legal fees for a plaintiff electing for statutory damages, the 
attorney fees provision of § 1117(b) was only applicable in cases that had actual 
damages under § 1117(a).158  Using the aforementioned framework, the Court 
determined that an election to receive statutory damages under § 1117(c) 
precluded an award of attorney fees under § 1117(b).  Therefore the district 
court had abused its discretion in awarding K&N $100,000 in attorney fees.159  
Notably, the Ninth Circuit made it explicitly clear that they were only holding 
that the election of statutory damages precluded an award of attorney fees 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).160  The Ninth Circuit declined to answer the broader 
                                                                                                                   
 150 K&N Eng’g, 510 F.3d at 1079. 
 151 Id. at 1080–81. 
 152 Id.  
 153 Id.  
 154 Id.  
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 1081. 
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. at 1082. 
 159 Id. at 1083. 
 160 Id. at n.5 (leaving open the question of whether the election of statutory damages allowed 
for an award of attorney fees under § 1117(a)). 
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question of combining statutory damages with attorney fees, holding only that it 
was improper to do so under the authority of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 
 b.  The Second Circuit Approach.  The Second Circuit answered the broader 
question concerning whether the election of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(c) precluded an award of attorney fees in 2012.161  The Second Circuit 
case dealt with a large scale counterfeiting operation conducted by two 
defendants, Lam and Chan, that involved the importation of more than 300,000 
handbags, wallets, and other products that resembled luxury goods produced by 
Louis Vuitton.162  In 2006 Louis Vuitton filed suit against Lam and Chan’s 
corporate entity, asserting various trademark claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 
1125(a), and 1125(c).163  Five trademarks owned by Louis Vuitton were at issue 
in the litigation.164  Louis Vuitton alleged that the defendants had supplied tens 
of thousands of items bearing counterfeits and infringements of Louis Vuitton 
trademarks to wholesalers and retailers throughout the U.S.165  The district 
court granted summary judgment to Louis Vuitton on the counterfeiting and 
infringement claims and then set out to determine appropriate damages.166  In 
the order awarding Louis Vuitton $3 million in statutory damages, the district 
judge noted the inability to account for the defendants’ expenses and profits, 
and the limited records, accountings, and invoices they produced.167  The 
district judge found Louis Vuitton request for attorney fees to be reasonable and 
awarded the entire requested amount of $556,034.22.168 
The Second Circuit framed the issue as follows:  
does the election of statutory damages under § 1117(c) instead of 
actual damages per § 1117(a) supplant only the part of § 1117(a) 
that details the method for determining the amount of damages 
with the method set forth in § 1117(c), or does it supplant the 
entirety of § 1117(a) including the provision for attorney’s fees in 
“exceptional cases”?169 
                                                                                                                   
 161 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 676 F.3d 83. 
 162 Id. at 88. 
 163 Id. at 89 (“[T]he LV Logo mark, three different geometric floral motifs, and a composite 
pattern consisting of repetitions of the LV Logo Mark centered inside the three Flower Design 
Marks.”). 
 164 Id. at 88. 
 165 Id. at 87. 
 166 Id. at 92–93. 
 167 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107592, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 3, 2008). 
 168 Id. at *4. 
 169 Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 106. 
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To put it another way, does subsection (c) stand on its own, or is it to be read as 
simply replacing everything, save for the last sentence of subsection (a)?  Several 
district courts have concluded that an election of statutory damages precludes 
an award of attorney fees, even in an “exceptional case.”170  However, other 
district courts have taken an opposite position, holding that an award of 
attorney fees in conjunction with statutory damages is not prohibited.171 
In determining the issue on appeal, the Second Circuit distinguished its case 
from the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in K&N Engineering, as the attorney fees were 
awarded under the last sentence of § 1117(a), rather than under § 1117(b).172  
Commentators remain divided on the issue of combining statutory damages and 
attorney fees.173 
In conducting its statutory analysis, the Second Circuit held that the election 
of statutory damages under § 1117(c) replaced the actual damages and profits 
from § 1117(a), rather than replacing all remedies under § 1117(a), including 
attorney fees in exceptional cases.174  In its comparison of § 1117(c) to § 1117(a) 
and § 1117(b) the court noted that because both subsections (a) and (b) include 
provisions for attorney fees, which suggests that § 1117(c) allows attorney fees 
for exceptional cases as well.175  The court then noted that Congress passed the 
1996 Act in an effort to ensure that plaintiffs would receive more than de 
minimis176 compensation because actual damages were difficult to prove, 
despite the obvious inference of damage to the plaintiff from defendant’s 
                                                                                                                   
 170 See, e.g., Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Global Moving Express, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 3776 
(RJH)(KNF), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60794, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2007); John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. v. Kauzin Rukiz Entm’t & Promotions, No. 06 Civ. 12949 (SAS)(GWG), 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 42095, at *9–10, 2007 WL 1695124, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2007); Gucci Am., Inc. 
v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 2d 511, 522–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 171 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107592, at *7–8 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2008); Nike, Inc. v. Top Brand Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76543, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2006). 
 172 Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 107. 
 173 Compare 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 23:67 (4th ed. 2011) (“[A] prevailing plaintiff who elects 
statutory damages under the Lanham Act in a counterfeiting case is not entitled to attorney 
fees.”), with 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 30:95 n.9 (4th ed. 2012) (describing the Ninth Circuit’s K&N Engineering decision in the 
subsection (b) context as “a hyper-technical reading of the statute” and lamenting that it fails “to 
read Lanham Act § 35 as an integrated whole”). 
 174 Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 109. 
 175 Id. at 109 n.25. 
 176 See K&N Eng’g, Inc., 510 F.3d at 1081 (sales of decals by defendant amounted to $267, while 
attorney fees amounted to $100,000). 
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unlawful behavior.177  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of 
attorney fees based on a finding of willful infringement.178 
 c.  Recent Developments in the Ninth Circuit.  A recent case within the Ninth 
Circuit has endorsed the Second Circuit’s ruling in Louis Vuitton.179  In Ploom, 
Inc. v. iPloom, LLC, the plaintiff produced a vaporizer, under the model name 
PAX, and registered assorted trademarks for both the brand name and the 
model name.180  The defendant, iPloom, was engaged in the business of selling 
vaporizers under the names “iPloom Pax” and “Pax by Ploom” using 
counterfeit reproductions of the plaintiff’s registered marks.181  The district 
court found the Second Circuit’s argument in Louis Vuitton182 persuasive and 
awarded the plaintiff attorney fees in conjunction with statutory damages under 
15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).183 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Part IV makes four separate arguments.  First, the proper standard for 
proving exceptionality should be a preponderance of the evidence, and the use 
of the clear and convincing standard should be abandoned.  Second, courts 
should adopt a party-neutral approach, which holds both plaintiffs and 
defendants to equal burdens when proving exceptionality.  Third, the proper 
criteria for determining exceptionality are whether the losing party’s actions are 
deliberate, malicious, willful, or fraudulent.  These criteria are to be applied to 
both pre- and post-suit conduct.  An exceptional case can arise from the facts 
of the matter, or the party’s conduct during litigation.  Fourth, successful 
plaintiffs who elect for statutory damages under § 1116(c) should not be 
precluded from receiving attorney fees in exceptional cases. 
A.  AN IMPROVED BURDEN FOR PROVING EXCEPTIONALITY 
The proper standard for determining whether a case satisfies the 
exceptionality provision of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) should be the preponderance of 
the evidence.  Federal courts should abandon the Fifth Circuit’s clear and 
convincing evidence standard.184  The similarities between the fee-shifting 
                                                                                                                   
 177 Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 110. 
 178 Id. at 112. 
 179 Ploom, Inc. v. iPloom, LLC, No. 13-CV-005813 SC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65204, at *25–
26 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2014). 
 180 Id. at *2. 
 181 Id. at *3. 
 182 See 676 F.3d 83, 111 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2012). 
 183 Ploom, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65204, at *26 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2014). 
 184 Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 555. 
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provision in patent185 and the fee-shifting provision in trademark186 lends 
credibility to the argument that the Supreme Court’s holding in Octane Fitness, 
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.187 is persuasive within the trademark realm.  
A preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient to ensure that attorney 
fees are not awarded in cases where pre-suit and post-suit actions are conducted 
within the realm of acceptable conduct.  A higher standard would serve only to 
burden prevailing plaintiffs and defendants.  If potential litigants feel that the 
recovery of fees is unlikely, they may make the rational economic decision to 
abstain from litigation.  Diligent prosecution of infringement only serves to 
strengthen trademark law, and creates a general deterrent to would-be 
infringers.  Reserving litigation only for parties flush with cash weakens all of 
trademark law. 
B. A PARTY NEUTRAL APPROACH 
When determining whether an award of attorney fees is proper under 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(a), courts should favor a party-neutral approach.  Legislative 
history of the 1975 amendment, which introduced the fee-shifting provision to 
the Lanham Act, referenced equitable considerations as justification for a 
court’s award of attorney fees.188  
From a policy standpoint, Congress appeared to be equally concerned with 
providing a remedy for the plaintiff whose trademark was infringed and the 
defendant who must litigate a frivolous suit, despite no wrongdoing on its part.  
The Senate Report explicitly references that prevailing defendants are eligible 
for attorney fees to help protect against unfounded suits.189 
The argument that a party-neutral approach is unworkable, as the 
Massachusetts district court articulated in Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle 
Co.,190 represents an inflexible approach.  It is given that a plaintiff is always 
acting deliberately by filing a lawsuit.  The argument that prevailing defendants 
should be granted attorney fees as a matter of course is a hyper-specific reading 
of the statute that is simply too inflexible to comport with the equitable 
considerations Congress outlined.  Prevailing plaintiffs and defendants can be 
                                                                                                                   
 185 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees 
to the prevailing party.”). 
 186 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.”). 
 187 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (holding 
that preponderance of the evidence was the proper standard for determining an award of attorney 
fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285). 
 188 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 189 S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.N. 7132, 7135. 
 190 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
21
Willett: Exceptionally Vague: Attorney Fee Shifting Under the Lanham Act
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
232 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 23:211 
 
held to the same standard by simply adjusting for the obvious differences 
between their roles in litigation.  Deliberateness on the part of losing defendants 
would naturally center on their role in the alleged infringement and their 
conduct during litigation.  For losing plaintiffs, the focus is on whether they 
deliberately brought a suit that was willful, fraudulent or malicious. 
Unequal burdens are not a proper solution because they are inherently unfair 
and fail to give proper respect to the purposes served by prevailing plaintiffs 
and defendants in litigation.  The defendant who successfully defends a 
malicious suit brought by a plaintiff is just as important to the trademark 
community as the plaintiff who diligently prosecutes counterfeiters who infringe 
upon his marks.  Both the prevailing defendant and plaintiff are vital to creating 
strong norms within the trademark community, which ultimately deter would-
be infringers.  The Fourth Circuit approach of allowing defendants to recover 
attorney fees with a showing of something less than bad faith191 characterizes 
the issue of attorney fees from a fundamentally unfair place.  Courts should be 
just as concerned with a losing plaintiff’s conduct as that of an unsuccessful 
defendant.  Under this approach, a losing plaintiff who conducts himself in the 
same manner as a losing defendant could be required to pay attorney fees solely 
because of his status as a plaintiff. 
The Fourth Circuit has seemingly recognized that its differing burden 
approach is no longer good law in the wake of Fogerty.192  While Fogerty is not 
binding authority within the trademark realm, it is significantly persuasive 
authority to amend the trademark statute.  An amended trademark statute 
would make clear that both plaintiffs and defendants are held to equal burdens. 
This does not mean that the courts will look for the same type of behavior 
in determining whether a case qualifies as exceptional.  Plaintiffs and defendants 
naturally play differing roles in the trademark litigation process, and courts must 
approach their analyses with a nuance that recognizes those differences.  
Obviously, deliberate conduct on the part of a losing plaintiff may not serve to 
make a case exceptional.  The act of filing a lawsuit is always deliberate, so 
naturally, courts will not weigh the deliberateness factor very heavily in a case 
with a losing plaintiff.  It is reasonable to entrust the court system with the 
responsibility to discern what factors are relevant to a given situation.  It would 
be impossible to list out every conceivable action that could lead a court to find 
a case exceptional.  As such, the courts must be provided with a flexible 
framework that allows judges to interpret each case individually. 
The next question to be answered is what an amended attorney fees statute 
in trademark would look like.  The current statute reads, “the court in 
                                                                                                                   
 191 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra notes 106–07. 
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exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”193  
One sentence at the end of a section primarily concerned with recovering 
profits fails to do justice to an important issue like the recovery of attorney fees.  
Congress should draft a separate subsection on attorney fees that would be 
applicable to § 1117(a) and § 1117(c).194  This amended statute would make 
clear that the prevailing party must demonstrate the exceptionality of the case 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  Further, in the spirit of equitable 
considerations, both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants would be held to equal 
burdens.  The amended statute should also provide guidance for determining a 
finding of exceptionality both in regards to conduct that occurs prior to and 
during litigation. 
C.  CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING EXCEPTIONALITY 
The type of conduct that can lead to a finding of exceptionality can be 
placed into two distinct categories.  Conduct that occurs prior to litigation will 
focus on the actions that gave rise to the lawsuit being filed.  Pre-suit conduct 
giving rise to exceptionality will primarily focus on the defendant’s conduct.  
The actions of a defendant who has clearly infringed via counterfeiting would 
be sufficient to deem a case exceptional from the outset of the suit.  Conversely, 
the plaintiff who files a groundless suit for the purpose inflicting economic 
harm upon the defendant has initiated a case that would qualify as exceptional.  
Judge Posner characterizes the aforementioned act by a plaintiff as malicious 
prosecution.195  He further describes malicious prosecution as the filing of a 
baseless suit for the purposes of harassing or intimidating a competitor.196  
When courts examine pre-suit conduct, they should do so from an objective 
point of view.  The proper analysis is whether a reasonable person would find 
the culpable party’s actions to be deliberate, malicious, willful, or fraudulent.     
Exceptionality can also be found from conduct that occurs during litigation.  
Again, Judge Posner articulates this viewpoint in a 2010 Fourth Circuit 
Opinion.197  Culpable conduct during litigation that can give rise to a finding of 
exceptionality should be characterized as an abuse of process.  Posner simply 
defines abuse of process within this context as, “the use of the litigation process 
for an improper purpose, whether or not the claim is colorable.”198  It is vital 
                                                                                                                   
 193 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
 194 It would not be necessary to include § 1117(b) as that section includes a guarantee of 
attorney fees so long as the other statutory elements are proven. 
 195 Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
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that courts consider litigation conduct when making a determination of 
exceptionality, because culpable acts during litigation can be just as damaging as 
those that occur prior to litigation.  The party that uses the litigation process 
only to wreak financial damage on the opponent is just as culpable as the party 
who willfully infringes or files a baseless lawsuit.  The fact that a defendant 
plays a different role than a plaintiff in the litigation process is not a bar to a 
finding that a losing defendant abused the litigation process.  As Posner 
articulates, “[p]redatory initiation of suit is mirrored in predatory resistance to 
valid claims.”199  An excellent example of abuse of process can be found in a 
2003 Second Circuit case, Patsy’s.  The case dealt with trademark infringement 
concerning tomato sauce sold by two Italian eateries.200  Attorney fees were 
ultimately awarded despite the defendant having a colorable defense.  The 
submission of fraudulent documents sufficiently justified an award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing plaintiff.  The defendant used the litigation process for an 
improper purpose.  Rather than defending against the alleged infringement 
claim, it sought to demonstrate that the plaintiff was actually the one guilty of 
infringement. 
This case is also demonstrative of the fact that given a flexible framework, 
the four factors from the 1975 Lanham Act legislative history are adequate for 
determining exceptionality in regard to conduct during litigation.  While sparse, 
the legislative history of the amendment authorizing the award of attorney fees 
in exceptional cases provides insight into how exceptionality should be defined.  
The accompanying Senate Report makes specific mention of four different 
factors to use when determining exceptionality: deliberate, malicious, fraudulent 
and willful.201  The proper starting place for analysis is to examine the plain 
meaning of the aforementioned four factors. 
Deliberate is defined as “intentional, premeditated or fully considered.”202  
Deliberate conduct occurring pre-suit that gives rise to a finding of 
exceptionality will most likely center on culpable defendants.  The defendant 
who deliberately infringes a trademark via counterfeiting is a prime example of a 
case being exceptional due to deliberate actions.203  Malicious conduct is defined 
as “an intentional, wrongful act done willfully or intentionally against another 
without legal justification or excuse.”204  This factor encompasses both 
                                                                                                                   
 199 Id. 
 200 See supra notes 115–21 for a detailed discussion of the case. 
 201 S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974). 
 202 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 492 (9th ed. 2009). 
 203 See generally K&N Eng’g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier 
S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012) (where the defendant was engaged in the sale of 
counterfeit replicas of the plaintiff’s goods). 
 204 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (9th ed. 2009). 
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defendants who engage in counterfeiting, as well as plaintiffs who bring baseless 
suits.  Both parties can be guilty of acting maliciously if they seek to abuse the 
litigation process to inflict financial damage upon the opponent.  Willful and 
fraudulent are also tied into these factors, as a malicious act by definition is 
willful, and fraudulent acts are more than likely malicious. 
There is substantial conflict within the circuits as to whether bad faith is a 
prerequisite to a finding of exceptionality.  The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits require a finding of bad faith for a determination of exceptionality, 
whereas the First, Third and Ninth Circuits do not.  The addition of a perquisite 
finding of bad faith before a case may be deemed exceptional only further 
complicates the trial court’s task.  Bad faith is not mentioned anywhere within 
the legislative history of the 1975 amendment.  Bad faith is a notoriously fickle 
term to define, and its inclusion as a factor will only heighten the prospect of 
inconsistent results across the circuits.  The four factors from the legislative 
history are more than sufficient to address the multitude of possible exceptional 
cases that may arise.  Requiring bad faith only serves to increase the “circuit 
drift” alluded to by Judge Posner.205    
D.  AN ELECTION FOR STATUTORY DAMAGES UNDER § 116(C) SHOULD NOT 
PRECLUDE AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
The optimal solution for resolving the confusion over whether the election 
of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) precludes an award of attorney 
fees is to amend the statute.  However, in the absence of such an amendment, 
there is a compelling case to be made for allowing prevailing plaintiffs 
simultaneously to elect to receive statutory damages and receive reasonable 
attorney fees in exceptional cases.206  There is both textual support from the 
Second Circuit in the 2010 Louis Vuitton case, and a persuasive economic 
argument to be made using figures from the Ninth Circuit’s K&N decision in 
2007. 
Before examining the Second Circuit’s analysis in Louis Vuitton, an analysis 
of the legislative history of the 1996 Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection 
Act is necessary.  As demonstrated by the 1975 amendment authorizing an 
award of attorney fees under the Lanham Act, Congress’s discussion and 
analysis of the statutory damages amendment to § 1117(c) would be generously 
characterized as limited.  However, when examining the House Report in 
                                                                                                                   
 205 Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
 206 The argument for allowing statutory damages and attorney fees will naturally center on 
prevailing plaintiffs, as the statutory damages provision of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) is not relevant to 
defendants. 
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totality, it is readily apparent that Congress was concerned with finding ways to 
curb the growth of the counterfeit market.207  The Report noted the difficulty in 
ascertaining the true damage done by a counterfeiter, in large part because 
counterfeiters rarely keep accurate records.208  Fifteen U.S.C. § 1117(b)’s 
provision for treble profits to prevailing plaintiffs is of little use to a plaintiff 
who brings suit against a defendant whose operation is more akin to a criminal 
enterprise than a legitimate business with carefully maintained records.  The 
House Report references that the purpose of introducing the statutory damages 
provision is to provide compensation for the lost goodwill to businesses caused 
by counterfeiters. 
However, the legislative history referencing the statutory damage is quite 
limited.  As such, the analysis of whether the election of statutory damages 
prohibits an award of attorney fees is best viewed in the context of 
compensating trademark owners for lost goodwill and disincentivizing would-
be counterfeiters.  The lack of discussion in the legislative history should not 
give weight to the argument that the statutory damages provision of 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(c) is incompatible with an award of attorney fees.  It seems far more 
logically sound that Congress failed to consider the possible confusion created 
by the addition of subsection (c) in 1996 than a deliberate intent by Congress to 
allow for statutory damages and statutory damages only.  Such a deliberate 
intent by Congress would make litigation economically foolish, as in many 
instances, the statutory damages will not outweigh the costs of litigation.  In the 
K&N case, the cost of litigation exceeded the statutory damages by $80,000.209  
Trademark owners should not be forced into a cost-benefit analysis when their 
property is clearly infringed, even in cases of small-scale infringement.  
The Second Circuit in Louis Vuitton took the correct stance: subsection (c) 
merely replaces the actual damages and profits language of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) 
while leaving the language referencing an award of attorney fees in exceptional 
cases intact.210  In Louis Vuitton, the defendant produced limited sales records 
that prevented the plaintiff from conducting an accounting that could allow for 
an accurate estimation of the defendant’s sales.211  Without such an accounting, 
determining actual damages or lost profits with an acceptable degree of 
accuracy was an impossibility.  Louis Vuitton was faced with a choice: attempt 
to account for actual damages and profits despite inadequate records, or elect 
for statutory damages under subsection (c).  Given the defendant’s lack of 
                                                                                                                   
 207 See supra note 2 about growth of the counterfeit market. 
 208 See supra note 29 for a discussion on the House Report. 
 209 K&N Eng’g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 210 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 211 Id. at 95 (discussing the inadequate records and the amount of statutory damages and 
attorney fees awarded). 
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record keeping, Louis Vuitton’s potential estimate of actual damages and profits 
would have been dubious at best.  The only logical choice for Louis Vuitton 
was to elect for statutory damages.  Ultimately, Louis Vuitton was awarded 
three million dollars in statutory damages and a little over a half a million dollars 
for attorney fees.  Given that it was the defendant’s conduct that caused Louis 
Vuitton to elect for an award of statutory damages, it makes scant sense to 
prohibit Louis Vuitton from receiving attorney fees as well.   
Prevailing plaintiffs in counterfeit cases will choose the cause of action that 
will result in the largest award of damages.  Given that § 1117(b) allows for the 
recovery of whichever is greater, treble actual damages or treble profits,212 it 
follows that Congress wanted to promote as large of a recovery as possible for 
prevailing plaintiffs.  In the instance of Louis Vuitton, actual damages or profits 
would have been minimal, if they could have been proven with any certainty at 
all.  It follows that Louis Vuitton elected for statutory damages because that 
presented the opportunity for the largest recovery possible.  Lastly, given that 
Congress provides for an award of attorney fees in subsections (a) and (b) of 15 
U.S.C. § 1117, it seems unlikely Congress would purposefully leave subsection 
(c) without a provision for attorney fees.  The legislative history is completely 
devoid of any comments that articulate the viewpoint that statutory damages 
should stand alone, whereas actual damages and lost profits can be awarded in 
conjunction with attorney fees. 
The counter argument to the Second Circuit’s reasoning stems from an 
inflexible, strict reading of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).  Nothing within the actual text 
of the statute mentions attorney fees.  However, Congress referenced equitable 
considerations when making the decision amend the Lanham Act in 1975 to 
explicitly allow for the award of attorney fees in exceptional cases under the 
statute.213  Disallowing an award of attorney fees because a plaintiff chooses to 
elect an award of statutory damages runs counter to those equitable 
considerations.  The decision to elect for statutory damages will often hinge 
upon the defendant’s conduct.  If a defendant fails to keep adequate records, 
electing for statutory damages may be the plaintiff’s only manner of redress for 
the infringement.  It is overly simplistic to dismiss the idea of awarding attorney 
fees in exceptional cases based on subsection (c) not referencing attorney fees.  
Such an inflexible analysis only hinders the law and serves as a disservice to 
future litigants.214  Waiting for a legislative solution is unnecessary, and 
needlessly complicates trademark law.   
                                                                                                                   
 212 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2012). 
 213 S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974). 
 214 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision in K&N Engineering is representative of a strict 
reading of 15 U.S.C. § 1117, and demonstrates why statutory damages are 
necessary from an economic perspective.  The defendants in K&N Engineering 
had sold decals of the plaintiff’s trademark over the Internet.  Defendant’s sales 
resulted in revenues of $267 and no facts were provided as to the costs incurred 
to achieve that revenue.215  The district court awarded $20,000 in statutory 
damages and $100,000 in attorney fees,216 although these awards were ultimately 
reversed on appeal.  However, they perfectly illustrate why the economic 
argument for allowing statutory damages plaintiffs under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) is 
so persuasive.   
If K&N chose to pursue a cause of action under subsection (b), it would 
have been entitled to three times the profits or damages in addition to 
reasonable attorney fees.  Estimating damages would have been difficult 
because K&N was not in the business of producing decals of their logo for sale.  
The only time it had produced such decals in the past was in conjunction with a 
promotion for K&N enthusiasts.  Three times the defendant’s profits amounts 
to a paltry $901.  However, K&N was awarded in statutory damages nearly 
twenty times the actual profits.  If sales records for the defendant were not 
available or accessible, K&N’s only recourse would have been to elect for 
statutory damages under subsection (c).  It would be difficult for K&N 
management to rationalize $100,000 in litigation costs if they did not believe 
there was a strong likelihood of attorney fees upon prevailing.  A firm whose 
trademarks are infringed should not have to consider the economics of 
litigation when choosing whether to prosecute a clear infringer.  To not allow 
attorney fees in conjunction with statutory damages gives free reign to smaller-
scale infringers who keep little-to-no records.217   
The Ninth Circuit reversed the award of statutory damages because they 
were awarded under subsection (b).  As such, the court failed to answer 
whether statutory damages in conjunction with attorney fees was ever proper.  
However, because the Ninth Circuit chose not to elaborate on how the district 
court could have properly awarded attorney fees or even remand the case, it 
seems likely the circuit’s position is that an award of statutory damages stands 
alone.  Yet, such a stance does not make litigation economically viable.  As 
K&N Engineering demonstrated, prosecuting small scale infringers can still lead 
to a six-figure legal bill.  The Ninth Circuit may have a chance to reevaluate its 
                                                                                                                   
 215 K&N Eng’g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Large scale counterfeiting operations like that found in Louis Vuitton may result in statutory 
damages that make litigation economically viable, but courts should be concerned with decreasing 
incentives for counterfeiting operations on all scales. 
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position in the future as district courts in that Circuit have recently endorsed the 
Second Circuit’s reasoning in Louis Vuitton.218  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The determination of whether a trademark infringement case is exceptional 
is subject to a multitude of analyses across the circuits.  An amended 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(c) could bring clarity to this issue and ensure equitable results across the 
court system.  This begins by taking cues from Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
namely using a preponderance of the evidence as the standard for proving 
exceptionality and holding prevailing plaintiffs and defendants to equal burdens.  
A finding of exceptionality can be made using four factors: deliberateness, 
maliciousness, willfulness, or fraud.  These factors are considered from an 
objective point of view during both pre-suit conduct and conduct that occurs 
during litigation.  These factors should be applied from a party-neutral 
approach, where the plaintiff and defendant are held to equal burdens.  The 
only exception to the party-neutral approach shall be statutory damages, which 
are not available to defendants for obvious reasons. 
A clearer standard for exceptionality will strengthen the law from the 
perspective of both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants.  An amended statute 
would also make clear what is already logical: prevailing plaintiffs in 
counterfeiting cases who elect for statutory damages under § 1117(c) are eligible 
for an award of attorney fees, just as they would be under subsection (b).  These 
amendments serve to clarify the law and institute strong economic incentives to 
discourage trademark infringement and counterfeiting, while providing 
necessary resources to trademark owners to prosecute the unlawful use of their 
property.     
Clarifying when a prevailing litigant is eligible for an award of attorney fees 
will help potential plaintiffs and defendants make more informed decisions 
during litigation.  Parties will be better able to make decisions concerning 
settlements or proceeding to a trial if they believe an award of attorney fees is 
likely.  A clearer statute will lead to more cases where attorney fees are awarded 
to the prevailing party.  This will work to prevent infringement suits from being 
used as a weapon to stifle competition.  No longer will defendants be forced to 
acquiesce to unreasonable demands from harassing lawsuits on economic 
grounds. 
Lastly, the ability to elect statutory damages and still receive attorney fees in 
exceptional cases will allow trademark owners to vigorously defend their marks 
against infringers of all sizes.  There will always be a counterfeit monetary 
                                                                                                                   
 218  See Louis Vuitton, 678 F.3d 83 at 109. 
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incentive for infringers to engage in illicit commerce.  Allowing for attorney fees 
in conjunction with statutory damages will incentivize mark owners to not let 
infringement go unprosecuted.  As more and more infringers face dire financial 
consequences because of statutory damages and attorney fees, the incentives to 
engage in such activities will decline. 
30
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss1/8
